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Abstract
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) is part of the Uniﬁed Modeling Lan-
guage (UML). Within software engineering, UML is regarded today as an important
step towards development of high-quality object-oriented systems. OCL allows to
sharpen UML diagrams through invariants as well as pre- and postconditions. This
paper explains the functionality of the UML Speciﬁcation Environment USE which
allows to validate UML and OCL descriptions.
The paper shows that central safety properties of the train system described in
the well-known BART case study can be expressed with OCL. Test cases embodying
central aspects of this train system can be formulated within the USE system. It
can be shown that the safety properties are satisﬁed by the test cases examined.
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1 Introduction
The Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) [7] is regarded today as a very impor-
tant standard for the development of software systems. UML originated from
its main predecessor approaches Booch [3], OMT [11], and OOSE [6]. It is a
graphical modeling language supporting many phases in the software devel-
opment cycle by oﬀering diagrams and language features meeting the special
needs in respective phases. Many commercial tools for UML are available.
The Object Constraint Language (OCL) [7,12] is part of standard UML, but
up to now it is not supported by most commercial tools. OCL is a speciﬁcation
language supporting and enriching the UML with textual details which cannot
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be expressed in diagrammatic form. OCL allows to precisely describe system
structure by invariants and system behavior by pre- and postconditions.
Tool support for OCL is beginning to develop. Among the ﬁrst available
tools was our system USE (UML Speciﬁcation Environment), which is based
on conceptional work on the formal semantics of the OCL, the required UML
features [10], and work on the metamodel of OCL [9]. The main task of
USE is to validate and verify speciﬁcations consisting of UML class diagrams
together with OCL invariants and pre- and postconditions that are kept in a
USE speciﬁcation ﬁle (suﬃx .use). By validation, we mean that the developer
can give test cases by means of object diagrams and manipulations of them
and check whether the USE responses meet the intuition. By veriﬁcation we
mean that the test cases are formally checked with respect to invariants and
pre- and postconditions. There are special USE commands for creating and
manipulating object diagrams that can be accumulated in command ﬁles (with
suﬃx .cmd).
Also part of the USE system is a so-called snapshot generator based on the
language ASSL (A Snapshot Sequence Language), which not only oﬀers means
to change attribute values but also oﬀers loop constructs and other helpful
features. With so-called ASSL procedures, the manipulation can be done in
a more ﬂexible way. Such a procedure can also be seen as an implementation
of an operation of a class.
Especially for speciﬁcations involving formal aspects, we regard validation
systems as extremely helpful because they give feedback to developers in early
development stages. Other tools for OCL include the commercial tool from
Boldsoft [2], an OCL compiler [5], and the KeY tool [1].
The USE tool (excluding the generator extension) is developed as part
of the PhD thesis of Mark Richters [8]. The OCL 2.0 submission [13] that
is developed as an answer to the UML 2.0 Request for Proposals for OCL
includes a part regarding the formal semantics of UML/OCL which is based
on the mentioned PhD thesis. Therefore, the upcoming version of UML/OCL
does not implicate complex updates of the USE tool—the new version of
UML/OCL will rather be closer to the tool than the current version.
The BART case study description [14] informally describes a portion of
the Advanced Automatic Train Control (AATC) system being developed for
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. BART provides commuter rail
service for part of California’s San Francisco bay area. The overall objective
of the case study is to construct a system within the given infrastructure,
that can control the speed and acceleration of trains in the system subject to
various constraints, the central ones being the following: (1) A train should
not enter a closed gate. (2) A train should never get so close to another train
in front that if the train in front stopped suddenly, the (following) train would
hit it. (3) A train should stay below the maximum speed that segment of
track can handle.
In this paper, we demonstrate some of the features of the USE tool by
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specifying constraints for a part of the BART case study with OCL. We also
specify OCL expressions calculating speed and acceleration for trains as well
as updated positions. These expressions are embedded into ASSL procedures
to automate testing. The speciﬁcation is validated with several test scenarios
in USE.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present some parts from
our speciﬁcation consisting of a UML class diagram and a set of OCL invari-
ants. In Sect. 3, we describe a simple control algorithm that calculates speed
and acceleration for a train. In Sect. 4, an algorithm is described that lets
the trains move according to their current speed and acceleration. Section 5
shows our test scenarios and how they are performed. The results ﬁnally are
outlined in Sect. 6.
2 UML/OCL specification of the train system
Specifying the problem starts with the construction of the object model. The
class operations, especially the operation for controlling the trains, are speci-
ﬁed. OCL constraints specify the requirements each instantiation of the object
model (i.e. each system state) must fulﬁll.
2.1 The basic object model
trains() : Set(Train)
wcsd(t : Train) : Real
StationComputer
wcsd2(t : Train) : Real
control(t : Train)
scb 0..1 sce0..1
length : Integer
civilSpeed : Integer
grade : Real
exposure : enum{open,tunnel}
Segment
segBegin : Integer
segEnd : Integer
sb
previousPlus() : Set(Segment)
nextPlus() : Set(Segment)
currentTrains() : Set(Train)
1 se1
1
SegmentOrder
0..1 next
0..1 previous
Boundery
BelongsTo
On
*
Track
1
nose : Real
Train
a : Real
v : Real
vcm : Real
acm : Real
length : Real
currentSeg() : Segment
nextTrain() : Train
nextClosedGate() : Gate
stationComputer() : stationComputer
nextStop() : Real
*
open : Boolean
Gate
0..1
stationName : String
StationPlatform
Destination
arrivingdest
orig departing
Origin *1
1 *
1
ControlBegin ControlEnd
Fig. 1. UML object model of train system.
The UML class diagram in Fig. 1 depicts the object model all further
speciﬁcations refer to. A segment belongs to a track. The attributes of class
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Segment capture begin, end and length of the segment as well as civil speed,
grade and exposure. Segments are ordered by an association SegmentOrder.
For the sake of simplicity, segments can only be passed by a train from the
begin to the end, so trains can go only in one direction. A station platform is
a special segment additionally having a name. Segments can be bounded by
gates at the segment end. The attribute open of class Gate indicates whether
the gate is open or closed. A train is located on a track. The attributes of class
Train hold the location of its nose, its speed v, acceleration a, commanded
speed vcm and commanded acceleration acm with which the commanded speed
has to be achieved. The length of the train is also recorded. A train is originat-
ing from a station platform and has another station platform as destination.
A station computer controls trains on a part of the track. This part is de-
termined by a segment at which it begins (role sb) and one at which it ends
(role se).
The semantics of the operations in terms of OCL expressions will be pub-
lished in [4]. Here we only give some short informal explanations.
currentSeg() computes the segment on which the train is currently lo-
cated. nextTrain() ﬁnds the train which is in front of the given train. This
is the train it has to be avoided to crash into. nextClosedGate() gives the
next coming gate that is not open. The next stop of a train is either at the
next closed gate or at the back of the next train or at the end of its desti-
nation segment, depending on what is nearest. The operation nextStop()
calculates the absolute position of this place. The station computer that is
responsible for the train changes depending on the position. The operation
stationComputer() results in the currently responsible computer.
The operation nextPlus() applied on a segment results in a sequence
that includes the segment itself and all next coming segments. The operation
previousPlus() analogously gives the previous segments. currentTrains()
is the inverse of the operation currentSeg() of class Train. It gives all trains
that are currently located on the segment.
The operation trains() of class StationComputer is the inverse of the
operation stationComputer() of class Train. It gives all the trains the sta-
tion computer is currently responsible for. wcsd() calculates the worst case
stopping distance of a train t. The distance computed by wcsd2() is an
even more pessimistic stopping distance. control(t: Train) computes a
new commanded acceleration and speed for a train t. An algorithm for this
operation is explained in Sect. 3.
2.2 OCL constraints on the train system
We deﬁne the following OCL constraints for the system.
The invariant fitting states, that if for a segment there is a next segment,
the begin of the next is equal to the end of the former.
context Segment inv fitting:
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self.next.isDefined implies self.next.segBegin = self.segEnd
The length of a segment has to be the diﬀerence of segment end and begin:
context Segment inv correctLength:
self.segEnd-self.segBegin = self.length
Connected segments belong to the same track:
context Segment inv track:
self.next.isDefined implies self.track = self.next.track
The origin and the destination of a train have to be connected by a sequence
of segments:
context Train inv line:
self.orig.nextPlus()->includes(self.dest)
The segments that bound the region a station computer is responsible for are
connected.
context StationComputer inv bounderies:
self.sb.nextPlus()->includes(self.se)
The next three invariants form the central part of the speciﬁcation. They
formalize the main constraints of the train system. The control() operation
has to be designed in a manner that assures that these invariants do not fail.
The constraint civilSpeedSafety demands that a “train should stay below
the maximum speed that segment of track can handle”, i.e. the civil speed.
context StationComputer
inv civilSpeedSafety:
self.trains()->forAll(t | t.v <= t.currentSeg().civilSpeed)
“A train should not enter a closed gate”. The invariant with the name closed-
GateSafety says that if a next closed gate exists, the distance to it is greater
than the worst case stopping distance of the train, i.e. the train can stop in
time. Remember that the position of a gate is at the end of the segment it
bounds.
context StationComputer
inv closedGateSafety:
self.trains()->forAll(t |
t.nextClosedGate().isDefined implies
t.nose+self.wcsd(t) < t.nextClosedGate().segment.segEnd)
“A train should never get so close to a train in front that if the train in front
stopped suddenly (e.g., derailed) the (following) train would hit it”. The
invariant crashSafety says (analogously to the preceding invariant) that if a
train in front exists, the distance to it is greater than the worst case stopping
distance of the (following) train.
context StationComputer
inv crashSafety:
self.trains()->forAll(t | t.nextTrain().isDefined implies
t.nose+self.wcsd(t) < t.nextTrain().nose - t.nextTrain().length)
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3 A simple control algorithm
The ASSL procedure control(t: Train) implements the operation of class
StationComputer. We do not show the code of this implementation here but
rather explain the algorithm in an informal way.
The operation calculates for a train t a new commanded speed vcm and
commanded acceleration acm with which vcm has to be achieved. These val-
ues are calculated by OCL expressions and have to respect the constraints
of the train system including civilSpeedSafety, closedGateSafety and
crashSafety. After calculating the values the corresponding attributes of
the train are set.
The algorithm inspects the section of the track that begins with the nose
of the train and is twice as long as the (more pessimistic but less ﬂuctuat-
ing in length) worst case stopping distance wcsd2(t). Only civil speeds and
obstacles within this range are considered.
The commanded speed vcm is set to zero if the next stop (closed gate,
back of next train, or end of destination station platform) is within the range.
Otherwise it is set to the lowest of all civil speeds within the range.
To determine the value of acm, we calculate two auxiliary values acm-
CivilSpeed and acmNextStop at ﬁrst:
With csmin being the lowest civil speed within the range and seg being the
ﬁrst segment within the range with csmin as civil speed, acmCivilSpeed is the
acceleration needed to achieve a speed 2 mph below csmin at the beginning
of segment seg. So a violation of the invariant civilSpeedSafety should be
avoided. If the train happens to be already on that segment, acmCivilSpeed
is set to the current acceleration incremented by 0.5 mphps.
If the next stop is out of the range, acmNextStop is set to the current
acceleration incremented by 0.5 mphps. Otherwise, it is set to let the train stop
wcsd2(t) feet before the obstacle. In this way, a violation of the invariants
closedGateSafety and crashSafety should be avoided. Because wcsd2(t)
is shrinking when the train gets slower, the train ﬁnally stops in a (hopefully)
reasonable distance to the obstacle.
acm is set to the minimum of acmCivilSpeed and acmNextStop. The
acceleration is adjusted properly to be in the span of physically possible ac-
celerations. Finally, if the commanded speed is zero and the train is already
slower than 0.5 mph, the train is commanded to stop with an acceleration of -2
mphps. Remember that acm is just the commanded acceleration for reaching
vcm. When vcm is already reached, the actual acceleration a of the train is
(near to) zero, no matter of the value of acm.
4 Moving the trains
In order to be able to validate our speciﬁcation with the USE tool, we have to
simulate the progression of the train system. This requires a procedure that
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modiﬁes the attributes of the existing trains accordingly—the ASSL procedure
move() serves this purpose: it sets the attributes of the trains as they would
be after 0.5 seconds have gone by. move() does not correspond with any
operation of the object model.
We do not show the complete ASSL deﬁnition of move() here, but the
framework looks like this:
procedure move()
var
delta: Real,
gradeacc: Real;
begin
delta := [0.5];
for t: Train in
[Train.allInstances->asSequence()]
begin
[t].nose := [<OCL-expression>];
[t].v := [<OCL-expression>];
[t].a := [<OCL-expression>];
end;
end;
By using a for loop, the procedure sets the attributes nose (position), v
(speed), and a (acceleration) of all existing trains to new values that are
calculated by the OCL expressions.
The algorithm is as follows: The position of the nose is calculated by means
of the appropriate physical formula. However, if both v and vcm are zero, the
position remains unchanged, i.e. the acceleration due to grade does not have
any eﬀect. The train is “ﬁxed” once it has stopped.
Then the new speed v is computed. The train cannot go backwards, so
if the result of the computation is negative, the speed is set to zero and the
train stops. The speed is also set to zero if both v and vcm are zero.
Finally, the acceleration is set. If both v and vcm are zero, acceleration
is set to zero, too, i.e. the train is “ﬁxed” again. If the speed has achieved
the commanded speed (± 2 mph) the trains attempts to maintain this speed
by compensating the acceleration due to grade. To do this, the grade of the
segment the train will be located on in the next state is considered. If the
commanded speed is not achieved yet, the acceleration is set to commanded
acceleration.
5 Validation with USE
In this section we show how our OCL speciﬁcation can be validated with the
USE tool.
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5.1 Preparation
We create a USE speciﬁcation that includes the object model (see Fig. 1),
OCL constraints, and OCL speciﬁcations of the side eﬀect-free operations.
The two ASSL procedures move() and control(t: Train) are put into
a ﬁle procs.assl. Next we create a command ﬁle oneTrainThrough.cmd
that contains USE commands to create objects and links and to set attribute
values according to the sample track that is included in [14]. In oneTrain-
Through.cmd, one train with the name Choochoo and length 710 is set at the
end of Daly City Station Platform with all attributes (other than length)
set to zero. The resulting object diagram looks like the one shown in Fig. 2
except for the second train Chattanooga that is additionally included there
(attributes are not shown).
The ﬁrst thing we encounter after opening the speciﬁcation in USE (with
open bart.use) and executing the command ﬁle (with read oneTrain-
Through.cmd) is that the constraint Segment::fitting is violated several
times, i.e. the sample track contains some inconsistencies: Some segments are
overlapping, others have a gap between them.
use> check
checking structure...
checking invariants...
checking invariant (1) ‘Segment::correctLength’: OK.
checking invariant (2) ‘Segment::fitting’: FAILED.
-> false : Boolean
...
checked 10 invariants in 15.751s,
1 failure.
We now get more details of the violation of Segment::fitting. The checking
mechanism of USE cancels the examination of a constraint when the ﬁrst
violation is detected, so we got only the ﬁrst violating instance:
use> check -d Segment::fitting
checking structure...
checking invariants...
checking invariant (1) ‘Segment::fitting’: FAILED.
-> false : Boolean
Instances of Segment violating the invariant:
-> Set{@Seg_12300} : Set(Segment)
checked 1 invariant in 0.028s, 1 failure.
A look into oneTrainThrough.cmd reveals a gap between position 12369 and
12969. After having repaired this, three failures of the same type occur, which
we all relieve either by insertion of another segment or by modiﬁcation of a
segment’s attribute values.
In order to minimize typing when running a test, we create a command
ﬁle step.cmd with the following content:
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Fig. 2. Test scenario with two trains Choochoo and Chattanooga.
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gen start procs.assl control(Choochoo)
gen result
gen result accept
gen start procs.assl control(Chattanooga)
gen result
gen result accept
gen start procs.assl move()
gen result
gen result accept
The generator extension of USE is told to execute control(Choochoo) to
control the train Choochoo. However, the execution does not yet eﬀect a
change of the system state–the result is a sequence of USE commands that
are shown with the command gen result and executed with gen accept.
The same is done for the train Chattanooga. In test runs with only one train,
the controlling lines for the other are deleted for better eﬃciency. The last
three lines move the trains and therefore do a 0.5 seconds step into future.
To spare even more typing, we create a ﬁle run.cmd that contains several
times the command read step.cmd, so we only need to execute run.cmd to
run x steps.
5.2 The Test Scenarios
We want to run four diﬀerent test scenarios, diﬀering from each other in the
number of existing trains and in the origin, destination and current location
of the train(s). The objectdiagram in Fig. 2 shows the used portion of our
test track with two trains on it. Since the diagram does not show attribute
values, the positions of the trains can not be seen there.
We already mentioned the ﬁrst scenario that is created by executing the
command ﬁle oneTrainThrough.cmd. Only one train Choochoo is created.
It is put at the end of Daly City Station Platform with all attributes set to
zero (except for length which is set to 710). The train’s origin is Daly City
Station Platform, its destination is 24-th Street Mission Station Platform. In
this scenario, we mainly want to validate that the constraint civilSpeed-
Safety is respected. In addition, the behavior of the train when stopping at
its destination can be observed.
In the second scenario (created with oneTrainGate.cmd), we want to ob-
serve the train when stopping in front of a closed gate. Therefore, we set
the attribute open of the gate at position 12369 to false. All other settings
remain the same as in the last scenario.
Next, we want to examine the interplay of two trains, so we add another
train Chattanooga in twoTrainsOneWaits.cmd. Its origin is Balboa Park Sta-
tion Platform, the destination is Glen Park Station Platform. The test run
starts with Chattanooga at the end of Balboa Park Station Platform with
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speed and acceleration set to zero. Choochoo is expected to wait behind Chat-
tanooga when Chattanooga arrives at its destination.
In the fourth scenario, we continue with the preceding scenario by changing
the destination of Chattanooga from Glen Park Station Platform to 24-th
Street Mission Station Platform.
The console output after a step looks like this (taken from the ﬁrst sce-
nario):
run.cmd> read step.cmd
step.cmd> gen start procs.assl control(Choochoo)
step.cmd> gen result
Random number generator was initialized with 1286.
Checked 1 snapshots.
Result: Valid state found.
Commands to produce the valid state:
!set Choochoo.vcm = 36
!set Choochoo.acm = 0.3248
step.cmd> gen result accept
Generated result (system state) accepted.
step.cmd>
step.cmd> gen start procs.assl move()
step.cmd> gen result
Random number generator was initialized with 1953.
Checked 1 snapshots.
Result: Valid state found.
Commands to produce the valid state:
!set Choochoo.nose = 7323.01379999999
!set Choochoo.v = 34.6836
!set Choochoo.a = -0.1752
step.cmd> gen result accept
Generated result (system state) accepted.
If the execution of one of the procedures violates a constraint, the output
notes that no valid state is found. In this case, the system state will not be
modiﬁed. The job of the specifying engineer is to ﬁnd the reason for this
violation by looking into the details of the procedure execution with the -d
option of the gen start command and by reproducing parts of the procedure
with the USE OCL expression evaluator.
6 Conclusions
The validation exposed numerous faults of our OCL speciﬁcation. The spec-
iﬁcation shown in the previous section is the ﬁnal version that resulted from
several steps of reﬁnement. The exposed faults can be categorized as follows:
(i) Syntax errors. These errors of course can be found and corrected quickly.
(ii) Small mistakes like the inconsiderate use of < instead of <= or a forgotten
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algebraic sign.
(iii) Faults or inconsistencies in the case study description [14] that have been
adopted in the formal speciﬁcation. Examples of this kind are the faulty
sample track, the questionable use of vcm instead of v in the calculation
of the worst case stopping distance and the formula for acceleration due
to grade, which has to be multiplied with -1 to give the correct value.
(iv) Constants that are not adjusted properly. An example is the constant
0.5 in control(t: Train). When this speed is reached while braking,
the train has to perform a full brake (-2 mphps). The previous value of
this constant turned out to be unsuitable.
(v) Semantic errors. For example, in control(t: Train), setting the ac-
celeration so that the train stops a constant distance feet behind the train
ahead does not guarantee that crashSafety is always respected because
the worst case stopping distance could temporarily be longer than the
distance to the next train.
After reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation (which induced the present speciﬁca-
tion), no constraint is ﬁnally violated in any of the test runs.
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